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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES;
PAROWAN VALLEY PUMPERS ASSOCIATION, CEDAR VALLEY PUMPERS
ASSOCIATION and BERYL PUMPERS
ASSOCIATION; ENTERPRISE VALLEY
PUMPERS , INC . ,

SUPREME COURT
Case No.

16891

Appellants,
P.S.C.U.

-vs-

Case No. 76-023-04
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH; MILLY 0. BERNARD, Chairman; KENNETH RIGTRUP, Conunissioner; and DAVID R. IRVINE,
Commissioner,
Respondents.

The Appellants respectfully submit this Reply to·tne
Brief of C.P. National.
POINT I.
APPELLANTS ARE PROPERLY BEFORE THIS
COURT IN CONTESTING THE ACTIONS OF THE
COMMISSION AND IN REQUESTING THAT A REFUND
BE GRANTED.
Respondent's brief contends and initially argues that
Appellants have improperly stated a claim for relief and because
this court is not allowed to order a refund, Appellants action
should be barred.
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Respondent's argument is a misconception, and misses the
mark by misconstruing the language contained in appellants brief.
Appellants are properly before this court inasmuch as they are
requesting and arguing,

(1) that rates placed into effect by the

February 18 Order were not just and reasonable,

(2) that the

findings of the Commission were unsupported by the evidence, (3)
that the Commission improperly exercised its authority according
to law, and (4) that the constitutional rights of appellants
have been invaded.
Section 54-3-1, U.C.A. 1953, declares that "Every unjust or
unreasonable charge made, demanded or received for such product
or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful.
Implicit in appellants original brief in the statement of facts
and in Points I, II, III, and VI is the showing that the rates
allowed were unlawful and by clear analysis unjust and unreasonable
Points

III and VI of Appellants original brief argue that

the findings of fact made by the Commission are not supported by
any evidence.
Point

III of Appellants original brief argues that the

Commission improperly exercised its authority when it imposed
retroactive rates on customers and likewise Point VI asserted that
the conclusions of law by the Commission were arbitrary.
The issue of a violation of Constitutional rights is clearly
raised in Point V of Appellant's brief.
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One issue that presently deserves greater attention than
was afforded in Appellants initial brief is the question of who
has the power under Utah Statutes to grant a rate refund in this
matter.

The recent decision in Utah Department of Business Regula-

tion v. Public Service Commission, Case No. 16241, filed June 19,
1980, prompts this discussion.
Under the above case, this court refused to grant a refund
inasmuch as it would involve an entanglement with the legislative
power of ratemaking.

Under the facts of that proceeding the

Department of Business Regulation entertained the request for a
refund for the first time on appeal and it had never requested the
Commission to grant a refund either at a hearing or by way of
petition for rehearing.
Under the present factual setting, appellants initial request
for a refund was addressed to the Commission.

That request has

been repeated in a long string of hearings, re-hearings and appeals.
Our understanding of the language of the Utah Department of
Business Regulation case, supra,

(as yet unreported), insofar as

"refunds" are concerned, is that the amount thereof is to be
determined by the Public Service Commission, not this court.
this we agree.

With

Hearings to determine the facts should only be

held before the commission.

However, this court can properly

determine as a matter of law whether or not a refund is required
and can then direct the commission to establish the amount of the
same and how and to whom it is to be paid.
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In many jurisdictions the question of court or Corrunission
ordered refunds is explicitely mandated by statute.

In other

jurisdictions though, the matter has been of some dispute.

The

supreme Court of the State of Minnesota when confronted with
questions of whether the court could under certain circumstances
order a refund stated that there was no statutory impediment to
requiring a utility to refund to consumers charges it had made
pursuant to an order of the Corrunission which was subsequently
reversed.

Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State Minn. Sup. Ct.

No.130 1/2, 1974, 216 N.W. 2d, 841.

The court in providing its

reasoning stated at p. 858:
We recognize that there is authority for the
proposition that ratemaking is a legislative
process with some of the attributes of a statute
and that rates which have been approved by a
commission are valid until set aside.
In jurisdictions adopting this rule, the reversal of a
corrunission order increasing rates has only prospective effect.
However, we think the better
view was expressed in Mountain States T.&T. Co.
v. Pulbic Utilities Corron., Colo., 502 P.2d 945,
949 (1972), where the court allowed benefits,
accruing as a result of a revision in its public
utilities corrunission's order, to be passed on to
telephone subscribers.
[17]
In scrutinizing the Minnesota statutes
which govern telephone rates, we find no impediment to authorizing a refund.
Minn.St. 237.06
declares that "[a]ll unreasonable rates, tolls,
and charges are hereby declared to be unlawful."
Section 237.08 prohibits a telephone company
from collecting or receiving a greater or lesser
rate than that on file with the Public Service
Commission. We do not construe that statute to
prevent a refund if the commission's order is
ultimately found to be invalid.
Section 237.25
deals with the trial court's scope of review.
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It provides in part:
"[I]f the court finds that
the order appealed from is unjust, unreasonable,
and not supported by the evidence, it shall make
such order to take the place of the order appealed
from as is justified by the record before it."
Finally, § 237.26 provides:
If no appeal is taken from any order of the
department, as above provided, then in all litigation thereafter arising between the state and
any telephone company or between private parties
and any telephone company, the order shall be
deemed final and conclusive.
[18]
Nothing in our statutes, unlike those
in Illinois, for example, expressly deals with
the question of whether new rates shall be enforced
or suspended pending appeal. Nor do the statutes
provide for segregating in a special fund amounts
received under a new rate schedule pending a final
decision on appeal. We conclude that the Minnesota statutes contemplate that only rates ultimately .found to be reasonable shall be charged
against subscribers and:.~:that amounts collected by
a utility pending appeal enjoy no unique immunity
from the claims of those to whom they rightfully
belong.
[19] We leave to the Public Service Commission the mechanics of determining the amount of
refund which is due and the precise manner of its
distribution.
Utah statutory language as it applies to utilities is analagous to that of Minnesota's.

Section 54-3-1, U.C.A. 1953,

(as

previously cited) states as does the Minnesota statute that unjust
and unreasonable charges are prohibited and declared unlawful.
Section 54-7-12, U.C.A. 1953, generally prohibits a utility from
changing or increasing rates unless on file with the Commission,
and Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 76,

(Commission Rule of

Practice Under Rule 21, Section 21.6) like Minnesota's allows this
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court to "reverse, affirm or modify any order or judgment appealed
from."
Irregardless of whether it is a court or corrunission ordered
refund, appellants contend that the Commission has no alternative
but to order a refund of revenues collected by C.P. National
pursuant to an order which was subsequently reversed by this court.
Section 54-7-17(4) U.C.A. 1953, providing for a stay of commission orders and other procedures on appeal, contemplates such
requested refunds and it has been shown in Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. v. Public Utilities Corrunission, 502 P.2d 945

(Colo. 1972),

that the stay provisions of this section are separable from the
refund provisions and are not mandatory.
It is for these reasons that relief should be granted and a
refund ordered in this proceeding.
POINT II.
THE CONCEPT OF "OFFSET AND PASS-THRU"
CASES HAS NO APPLICATION TO THIS CASE SETTING.
It is appellants initial and repeated position that at the
time this court reversed and remanded the case of Parowan Pumpers
Ass'n v. Public Service Commission, 586 P.2d 407,

(Utah, 1978),

the prior rates imposed by the corrunission became invalid and that
any attempt to reinstate by amendment such rates would constitute
retroactive rate making.
While some courts have held that rates approved by a commission are valid until set aside, current authority has more consistently held that an invalid order is void from its inception, and
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rates collected pursuant thereto are therefore subject to refund.
In Gulf, C.& S.F.R.Y. Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 130
S.W. 2d 1030 (1939), the Texas Supreme Court stated:
Manifestly, to hold that either the shipper
or carrier could be required to pay or collect
~n i~lega~ rate p~nding ~he statutory proceeding in which the illegality of the rate is
determined, would be unfair to both the shipper
and the carrier; and the constitutionality of
such a rule is seriously doubted.

* *

*

When the court exercises this statutory
jurisdiction and declares the rate order
invalid from its inception, and the rate
order must be regarded as if it never
existed.
(emphasis added)
Further in support of this proposition, appellants cited in
their initial brief the decision of City of Los Angeles, et al. v.
Public Utility Commission, et al., 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 497 P.2d
785 (1972), which held that:
When the rates set in the decision before us
are annulled, the only lawful rates are those which
were in existence prior to the instant decision.
We are satisfied that to permit the commission to
fix new rates for the purpose of refunds, as requested by Pacific, would involve retroactive
rate making in violation of the principles recognized in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm.
supra, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 649-656, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1,
401 P.2d 353.
Respondent's argue in their brief that the

above California

holding is limited by the California rule which "in effect" allows
retroactive ratemaking in "Offset and Pass Thru" cases.

By

analysis they argue that the present fact setting involves an
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"offset or pass-thru" type proceeding and as such should not be
subject to the non retroactive rate making rule.
In support of their position that the California courts
allow this type of procedure, they cite the 1978 decision in
Southern California Edison Company v. Public Utility Commission,
144 Cal. Rptr. 905, 576 P.2d 945 and the 1979 decision California
Manufacturers Association v. Public Utility Commission, Southern
California Gas Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company,
155 Cal. Rptr. 664, 595 P.2d 98, and conclude the following:
Thus, the most recent decisions of the
California Supreme Court have limited the
rule prohibiting retroactive rate making to
a general rate case and have determined that
the rule has no application to the abbreviated
"off se.t" or "pas s-thru" proceedings.
The above assertion of Respondent is highly misleading.
Both of the above California cases dealt exclusively with abbreviated proceedings concerning "narrowly restricted" and
"semi-automatic" fuel cost adjustment clauses.

Here, the Califor~

court language dealing with retroactive rate making is taken out
of context by respondent when it is construed to have application
to other than a fuel cost adjustment proceeding.

Respondents are

clearly aware that the California courts confined such "nonretroactive" language only to fuel adjustment proceedings and to
none other.
Hence, respondents are involved in purely speculative reasoning wh~n they state that the case now before this court is an
"offset or pass-thru" proceeding.
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This present case is not a fuel adjustment clause proceeding,
but is one that more clearly resembles a general rate proceeding.
Because of this, rates should be allowed to take effect only on
a prospective basis and respondents argument that the California
rule should apply should be totally disregarded.

11",

DATED this q7gJ~ay of August, 1980.

a~Aw~M_/

,..,---JAMES L . BA
( ~Assistant Attorney General
\._/

OTT LE
Clyde & Pratt
Attorney for Protestants,
Plaintiffs herein
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